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PICTURES OF BULGARIA

 

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:

RELIANCE ON CENTRALIZED OR REGIONAL SYSTEM

 

Abstract

 

The purpose of project is to examine two alternatives among the numerous recommendations to improve United Nations Peacekeeping. The first calls for improved centralization of United Nations Peacekeeping. The second calls for unification of Peacekeeping operations through joint efforts (political, economical, cultural, religious, military, etc.) at the regional level in order to include the parties involved in the conflict and their neighboring states in Africa, America, Asia and Europe. The goal of this project is to identify and understand the debate about the changing role of the United Nations Peacekeeping and to identify ways to more effectively manage operations.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

I.                  INTRODUCTION

II.               CENTRALIZED PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

A.                 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

1.         Peacekeeping Definition

2.         The Place and the Role of United Nations Peacekeeping

3.         Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping

4.                                                United Nations Peacekeeping System

5.         Basic United Nations Peacekeeping Procedures

B.                 EVALUATION OF CURRENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

1.         Advantages

2.         Disadvantages

C.                 GREATER MOVEMENT TOWARD CENTRALIZATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

III.           REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

A.        DESCRIPTION OF REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

1.         Definition of Regional Peacekeeping

2.         Types of Regional Organizations

3.         Examples of Regional Peacekeeping

4.         Regional Conflicts

B.        UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

1.         Forms of Cooperation Between United Nations and Regional Organizations

2.         Principles of Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations

C.        ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

1.         Advantages

2.         Disadvantages

IV.     CONCLUSIONS

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONIMS

 

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

ACRI African Crises Response Initiative

ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations

AU African Union

BRAHIMI REPORT The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

CIO Chairman-in-Office of OSCE

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CMO Chief Military Observer

COW Coalition of the Willing

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSO Committee of Senior Officials of OSCE

DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

EURRF European Union Rapid Reaction Force

FC Force Commander

GA United Nations General Assembly

GAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution

GGFPKO United Nations General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations

GIISA German Institute for International and Security Affairs

IFOR NATO Implementation Force

IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

KFOR NATO Kosovo Force

MNF Multinational Forces

MS Member States

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OAS Organization of American States

OAU Organization of African Unity

OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

P5 The five permanent members of the Security Council

PE Peace Enforcement

PfP Partnership for Peace

PK Peacekeeping

PKF Peacekeeping Forces

PKM Peacekeeping mission

PKO Peacekeeping operation

PO Peace Operation

PSO Peace Support Operations

RECAMP Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities

RO Regional Organization

ROA Regional Organizations and Arrangements

ROE Rules of Engagement

SADC Southern African Development Community

SC United Nations Security Council

SFOR NATO Stabilization Force

SG United Nations Secretary-General

SHIRBRIG Stand-By High Readiness Brigade

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General

TCC Troop-contributing Countries

UN United Nations

UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNLB United Nations Logistics Base, Brindisi, Italy

UNPKM United Nations Peacekeeping Mission

UNPKO United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

UNPKS United Nations Peacekeeping System

UNPROFOR UN Protection Force

UNSAS United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System

UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization

UN-USA United Nations Association of the United States of America

US United States of America

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 

I would like to thank the people and organizations that supported and assisted me in my education and completion of current MBA Report, as following:

-           The staffs of the Naval Postgraduate School and the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy;

-           My lead advisor Nancy Roberts and support advisor John Mutty;

-           Robert Tomasovic: for expert advice on Peacekeeping;

-           The World Bank: for granting me the right to use its research Armed Conflicts 1946–2001;

-           The Global Policy Forum and other institutions, organizations, universities and individuals: for making the information about Peacekeeping available on the Internet.

 

I.       INTRODUCTION

 

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping (PK) mediates peace negotiations, facilitates recovering constructive relationships between parties to a conflict and supports reintegration of society. It is an important instrument of the world community for maintaining international peace and security. As stated in the UN Charter’s Preamble (1948): “We the peoples of the United Nations are determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “… to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.”

The size, cost, and scope of UNPK activities have changed dramatically since the 1940s. There has been a surge of conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 2002 (14 year-period) 39 PK operations (PKOs) were deployed (UN current and completed peacekeeping operations) while only 15 were deployed before 1989 (40 year-period). A rough comparison of the total number of operations and the total number of world armed conflicts (minor, intermediate, and wars) over the periods 1948-1988 and 1989-2001 (Table 1) shows an increase from 5% to 18% respectively.

 

 

Table 1.            Total number of Peacekeeping Operations and the total number of world conflicts (After: The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the World Bank)

 

Expenditures for PKOs also have increased dramatically as depicted in Figure 1. UN costs for just one mission (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia (North Atlantic Treaty - NATO and other organizations expenditures not included) were estimated to be $4.6 billion (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations). Moreover, many operations have become multidimensional to include PK, peace enforcement (PE), support of elections, and humanitarian aid. The type of conflict also has changed - intra-state conflicts with transnational effects, such as the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda.

 

 

Figure 1. Peacekeeping Expenditures: 1947-2001 (After: Renner)

 

Critics have charged that the UNPK, especially since the end of the Cold War, has not been successful. Some focus on its internal operations, specifically its inefficiency and lack of strategy and accountability (The Challenges Project, 2002, p. 143). Others criticize its failure to respond in a timely manner to major crises, such as its failure to deal with the horrible genocides in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia (Report on Wilton Park Conference 700). Still others find its results and outcomes to be less than effective, such as the UN efforts in Bosnia (Americans & the World).

There are many recommended changes in UN PKOs to correct these deficiencies (e.g., 57 recommendations of The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - The Brahimi report). This report will focus on one of them - how UNPK should be designed. Two options are considered: the centralization of UNPK management and alternatively, the decentralization of UNPK through delegation of authority and the empowerment of regional bodies.

Centralization has its advantages. It offers a unity of purpose and tighter coordination among the various organizations that participate in peace operations - non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN organizations, national governments and their organizations, as well as businesses. It encourages agreement among all the players on common goals and a conflict prevention strategy. It promises tighter controls over activities, a division of labor, greater economies of scale, and better utilization of resources.

Decentralizing PKOs at the regional level, on the other hand, also has its advantages. Regional security systems have the opportunity to take into account each region’s unique features and requirements. PK in Africa, for example, is different from PK in Asia. Specialized knowledge and expertise also could be developed to fit each region’s circumstances. Without long distances to travel, and fewer players to participate in the decision making process, regional systems also could respond more quickly before crises escalate. In addition, local mediators, more aware of local customs and issues, are likely to be more acceptable to combatants.

Which option - centralization or regionalization - provides the greatest advantages and the least disadvantages for peacekeeping in the future? This is the central question this project addresses. Chapter II examines the centralized PK system. Chapter III outlines what a regional system would entail. Ultimately, the report concludes that there are some issues and decisions that are best centralized while others are better decentralized at the regional level. Moreover, there is a need for combining UNPK and regional PK advantages so that an overall system can be developed.

 

II.      CENTRALIZED PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

 

A.        GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

                                                                         

1.                  Peacekeeping Definition

The UN initiated PK as a technique for maintaining international peace and security in 1948.[1] It is the major international organization whose purpose is to uphold world peace and security. According to UN standard definition PK is: “a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.” (UN General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations - GGFPKO, 1995, p. 5) It means the UN’s presence as a third party in the field should mediate (World Bank Institute and Interworks, 1999, Chapter 4.6) peace negotiations, facilitate recovering constructive relationships between parties of a conflict, support reintegration of society and bring it to a self-sustaining status.

Military observer missions and PK forces (PKF)[2] represent the “traditional” PK. Examples of PK activities are monitoring of cease-fires and compliance with agreements, investigation of violations, demilitarization, demobilization and disarmament, preventive deployment and early warning to the UN Security Council (SC).

 

2.         The Place and the Role of United Nations Peacekeeping

The Brahimi report sets the PK within main UN Peace Operations’ (POs) elements along with Conflict prevention, Peacemaking and Peace-building. In a couple of cases, the UN has implemented PE because of a lack of local authority or its malfunction, possession of heavy armaments by opposing parties and extremely dangerous situations to local populations and UN missions. The elements enumerated above are depicted in Figure 2.

 

 

Figure 2. Peace Operations and Peace Enforcement (After: The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000, pp. 2-5)

 

Conflict prevention and Peacemaking employ diplomatic ways to avoid confrontations. Conflict prevention touches the bottom-line of PO because it creates the base of peace in the long run through restructuring sources of potential conflicts before their eruption. Peacemaking mediates negotiations between parties to the dispute. Peace-building opens the reconstruction of peace foundations shortly before the conflict ends. Some authors use a term “peaceshaping” referring to the combination of all the aforementioned activities.[3] In practice, peaceshaping is a complex dynamic process and all components are interrelated and interdependent. The Brahimi report recognizes the advantage and importance of long-term Conflict prevention as a better and cheaper alternative to violent conflicts and PKOs.

Bideke points out the recent tendency of mixed PK actions - PE under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Traditional PK under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. She describes the most common view of PKO as Traditional PK with an extension through PE or “more forceful actions”. PK is the last diplomatic tool different from war. Between the two poles there are many possible combinations of approaches and problems before such PKOs. So, they are still in a “growing gray zone”. PE is designed to fight any threats to the peace, violations of the peace, or acts of aggression.

There are other ways (networking) of dealing with the PK such as: COW[4] (e.g., NATO operations in the Balkans) and hiring private troops of mercenaries.[5] However, the UN does not provide funds to them. A new doctrine of mixed PE and PKOs has been developed in NATO and the United Kingdom and it is called Peace Support Operations (PSO). (German Institute for International and Security Affairs - GIISA, 2001, p. 27). The goal of the Doctrine is to “win the peace, not to win the war” through complex multifunctional operations.

Urquhart has described three historical phases of mankind’s efforts toward international peace and security after World War II in his article The United Nations' Capacity for Peace Enforcement. He makes a good point on the major drawback of the SC in PKOs – a failure to enforce its own decisions, and gives Bosnia as an example.

Akashi distinguishes four generations of PKOs. He considers the first-generation of PKOs as a classical type of PKOs. Its purpose is to end conflicts through disengaging parties and stopping their fight (securing a safe distance between opposing groups, monitoring cease-fires, maintaining a peaceful time for negotiations and resolution of disputes). They have impartial and symbolic nature and rely on the consensus of parties to the conflicts. Thus, UN forces are not required to fight, carry heavy equipment and pass through long expensive combat training.

New challenges to PK after the end of the Cold War forced the UN to undertake multidimensional PKOs (multi-faceted operations with complex functions including strengthening a local administration or its temporal replacement, human rights protection, refugee issues, facilitating elections, development, etc.). Such operations call for division of labor and diversity of experts: military officers, police officers and civilian experts. PKOs were transformed and have grown to second-generation. Both, the first and second generations, employed the same PK principles and according to Akashi were relatively successful.

He outlines third-generation PKOs as PE (based on the concept of coercive peace, or "peace enforcement") and gives the example of PKO in Somalia, which ended in tragedy. The operations are aimed at fighting a hostile environment and tremendous human rights violations. Akashi emphasizes a need for UNPK enterprise to work in the field with multinational forces and strategic allies – regional organizations (ROs) and especially NATO.

Recently the UN Secretary general (SG) stated new directions for UNPK by reconsidering its conventional principles and transition to fourth-generation PKOs (Akashi, 2000). They will not be PE, but troops should be equipped with powerful weapon systems and pass enhanced training. It is necessary in order to deter the great number fighting parties of civil wars that do not want to negotiate in any circumstances. Forces should have the capacity for self-defense. Significant progress has been made. (UN, Report of the SG).

 

3.         Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping

UNPK is governed by few principles. Dag Hammarskjöld[6] (the Second UN Secretary-General and one of the fathers of UNPK along with Pearson[7] and Urquhart[8]) created the following Principles of the Traditional UNPK (United Nations Association, United Kingdom, UNA-UK, United Nations Peacekeeping):

Legitimacy

A mission must have the authorization of the SC.

Consent and Cooperation

UN involvement in a conflict requires the consent of the parties to that conflict.

Impartiality and Objectivity

A mission must maintain operational neutrality and so must not influence the political balance of power between warring parties.

Non-use of Force

PK should not use coercive force, except in self-defense.

Personnel for an Operation Must be Recruited Voluntary from UN Member States

The five permanent (P5) members of the SC and states with interests in a conflict are excluded from the troop-contributing countries (TCC). Later the principle was developed to achieve a Sustained commitment of troop-contributing countries that calls for complete and active participation of all national units in the mission.

There are three more principles (GGFPKO, pp. 13-24):

Continuous and Active Support of the SC

Refers to the complexity of a PO, whose component is PK, and the need for consequential political and diplomatic actions from all UN Member States (MS) in support of SC and SG.

Clear and Achievable Mandate

Sets predetermined and realistic objectives that should reflect agreements for political and material support and optimize the goals to achieve.

Unity

The international community should maintain integrity as a whole and that of the units in the field.

PE does not obey some of Traditional PK principles such as: Consent and cooperation, Impartiality and Non-use of force. UNPK principles are based on the international principles of state political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity (UN General Assembly Resolution – GAR 2625 (XXV).

On the other hand, Akashi describes PKO as activities designed “to temporarily freeze a conflict situation, rather than establish lasting peace”. They should be replaced and followed by consistent peacemaking. PKOs have psychological and moral meanings and represent the international community's will for peace. Akashi outlines only the three most important PKO principles: consent and cooperation (the agreement between parties involved in a conflict to accept the deployment of PKF), impartiality and objectivity, and the limited use of weapons by PK troops, only to their self-defense.

The principles impose specific demands on the UNPK System (UNPKS) such as: a central authorization body – SC[9], UN direction, volunteering with certain limitations, co-operation of parties, political and military neutrality, and predetermined mandate of

force level. Hence, the UNPK should maintain a centralized system with an appropriate hierarchy, links between its structural elements, forces with high readiness, logistics, flexible funding, etc.

 

4.         United Nations Peacekeeping System

United Nations Peacekeeping System Hierarchy

The UNPKS hierarchy and links between its components are depicted on Figure 3.

 

 

Figure 3. Hierarchy of United Nations Peacekeeping System (After: United Nations, The United Nations System)

 

The General Assembly (GA) is the main governmental organ of the UN. Each MS is represented and has one vote. The GA makes decisions on the most important questions regarding peace and security, admission of new MS, budgets, etc. However, the GA’s decisions do not have legal binding force for individual governments. The GA appoints the SG on the basis of the SC recommendation. The GA considers the budgets of missions as well as all financial issues of the UNPKOs and allocates them to its Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary).

For a better understanding of GA functions it is necessary to include the committees established for different purposes and considering PK issues such as: the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) and The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The committees facilitate the GA activity in specific spheres.

Fifteen countries are represented in the SC. There are five permanent MS (P5): China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; and 10 countries with two-year membership terms from each of the world's regions such as: Africa and Asia (5), Latin America (2), Eastern Europe (1), Western Europe and other states (2). Thus, all regions are represented. On the other hand, each SC member has one vote and each state of the P5 has a right of veto. If the P5 lack unanimity, the situation can be overcome through the UN Uniting for Peace Resolution, empowering the GA for decision-making only in such occasions. Article 39 of the UN Charter gives the SC power to conduct PK and deploy missions as a principal organ: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The SC acts on behalf of all MS. According to the UN Charter, MS should accept and implement the SC’s decisions. Nine SC members must vote affirmatively in order for decisions to be made. Thus, the central organ of UNPK hierarchy bears a potential for extended discussions and consultations, a high level of output uncertainty, compromises and delays (Malone, 1998). There is a constant pressure for improvement of the SC composition, legitimacy and effectiveness (Limbert and Ramsbotham, 2000).

The SG is the Chief Administrative Officer of the UN (Article 97 of the UN Charter). The SG and the UN Secretariat staff have to act only under instructions and authority of the Organization (Chapter XV of the UN Charter). They are international officials and employees responsible only to the UN. The SG appoints the staff according to the regulations of the GA. The staff is assigned permanently to UN organs and is a part of the Secretariat. Staff policy is to maintain the highest competence, efficiency and integrity. An important factor is utilizing a geographical approach to the staff recruitment. The Secretariat includes the SG and the staff employed for UN Headquarters and fieldwork. The SG runs PKOs and informs the SC on the progress of missions.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provides means for the SG to carry out the decisions of the SC. Its functions include: formulating political and executive direction to field operations and procedures, generating recommendations for new PK missions, their planning and logistics support (GGFPKO, pp.38-39). It is a mediator between the SC, the troops, the parties involved in the conflict and financial sponsors. The head of DPKO is the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The organizational chart of DPKO is shown in Figure 4.

 

 

Figure 4. Department of Peacekeeping Operations Organizational Chart (From: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Organizational Chart)

 

It becomes obvious from the figure that the DPKO, especially its Office of Operations, has a regional specialization.

The SG appoints a Special Representative\Chief of Mission (SRSG) responsible for UN PKOs in specific regions with the approval of the SC. GGFPKO defines terms such as “head of a peacekeeping operation” and “chief of mission” applied to SRSG. He maintains an operational control over a mission on behalf of the SG and delegates authority to subordinates after consultations with UN Headquarters. SC resolutions and the letters of appointment give SRGSs specific mandates. Generally, the SRSG is internationally recognized and an individual the SG knows. For instance, Behrooz Sadry, a Deputy Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, joined the UN in 1957. He has had a distinguished career and a long experience in UNPK – Sierra Leone, Angola, DPKO, former Yugoslavia, Mozambique, etc. Another example is Legwaila Joseph Legwaila of Botswana - a SRSG and a Head of UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. A SRSG’s role is to be an ambassador of the UN to the parties of a conflict. Their contributions should facilitate crisis solution in the region.

The chief of the military element of a PKO is either a Force Commander (FC) or a Chief Military Observer (CMO). A FC discharges operational authority over all of the mission’s military units and their personnel. The recent multi-dimensional PKOs call for carrying out humanitarian relief, development, and other PK related tasks simultaneously. The features of PKOs impose a centralized authority of a FC over all active elements of the UN for enhanced coordination. The FCs are distinguished military officers of MS. The SRSGs provide political directions to FCs, mediate the reporting of FCs to and the approval of crucial operations by Headquarters in New York (Anyidoho, 2000). Obviously, the SC maintains political control and leadership over PKOs through the SG, SRSGs and FCs.

The predominant part of the UNPKS is multinational and bound only by a moral duty to uphold peace and security in other regions. There are two major players - MS and their alliances, on one side, and the executive organs of the UN Secretariat, SRSGs and DPKO, on the other side. The last is the heart of the system. On the other hand, MS should provide political will, cooperation and resources.

United Nations Peacekeeping System Resources

The UN does not have an army. MS provide military and police personnel to the UN on an ad hoc basis but they remain under respective MS’s overall authority. For example, UN troops wear distinct national uniforms and only blue helmets are common. National laws and regulations of MS continue to govern their military and civilian police personnel. They must obey the laws and regulations of host nations as well. The UN exercises only operational authority limited to a specific mandate, a mission area and an agreed time frame. MS can withdraw their forces when circumstances threaten the lives of contingency personnel. By the end of 2000, eight of the ten biggest TCC (UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Peacekeeping from 1991 to 2000) were developing countries from Asia: Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, and Pakistan, and from Africa: Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria (in alphabetical order). The participation is broader because 123 more states are donors of soldiers, about two-thirds of the UN total membership. Of them, Canada is the country with highest number of participations in Peacekeeping Missions (PKMs). Military personnel get additional salaries from the UN.[10] We should keep in mind that there are many volunteers who support PKOs in the field for free.[11] On the other hand, there are past and recent examples of COW and individual states, engaged with significant forces in PK, PE and peace deterrence (Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, etc.) at different stages of operations. The personnel policy and expenditures in such cases is a responsibility of respective states.

The UN depends on MS not only for personnel but also for other resources such as: vehicles, aircraft, equipment, medicine, etc. Their governments negotiate agreements on terms of their participation in UNPKM. The UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS runs most of the resources of UNPK using its UNSAS Military Handbook. MS provide resources (military units, civilian and military personnel, services, equipment, etc.), against UN reimbursement (for equipment – fixed rate of depreciation), under certain conditions within a specified response time. All their resources are stationed in homelands and maintained for their purpose and missions. Personnel training is the responsibility of the respective states as well. Generally, the above resources are utilized mainly for PKOs. Additionally, the UN has its own logistics system and a permanent logistics base (UNLB, Brindisi, Italy) for storing (e.g., “Start Up Kits” for new missions), rebuilding and shipping materiel world wide, providing satellite telecommunications between PKMs, UN agencies and headquarters, and personnel training as well.

United Nations Peacekeeping Funding

The assessed contributions are the primary resource of PKOs, even though there are voluntary donations. Assessment of contributions from MS to the PKOs budget is based on their financial and economic power. The main parameters are average and individual Per Capita Gross National Product of MS and group discounts. The countries are divided into groups from A to J level. Group A members (P5) pay a premium to offset discounts given to those in groups C to J who benefit from a discount of 7.5-90% (UN, GAR A/55/712, 2001, pp. 3-4). The five biggest contributors (excluding personnel) had, at one point, paid over 75% of PK expenses. That was one of the reasons for a scale changing in 2001 (US Department of State, Fact Sheet: The UN’s Ad Hoc PK Scale). Only three of them are P5 members - Britain, France and the US. Apportionment of PK costs is based on an ad hoc system. Money from the MS goes into the UN Support Account for PKOs, DPKO and the Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. In 1992, a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund was established to provide money for the start-up phase of PKOs. The fund contributes to UN rapid response policy. It gets money from active missions budgets. The PK centralized system is not aligned with the economic power of MS because the UN is a non-profit organization. Hence, dues to the PK budget appear as a double edge sword because the contributions have a significant impact on the PK direction, scope, resources and efforts.

A rough comparison between PK total arrears and total expenditures is useful in order to get an idea of how PK has been funded. It is necessary to know that overdues were accumulated over the years from all completed and current PKOs and can exceed PK expenditures in particular years. Arrears are compared to current year expenditures.

 

 

Figure 5. Arrears/Expenditures Ratio in Percent (After: Renner)

 

From the graph is obvious that overdues have a trend of exceeding expenditures (over 100%). In other words, UNPK enterprise has been systematically underfunded and that obstacle has limited its capacity to undertake new missions. MS donors have had to wait to be reimbursed by the UN for their PK services. That has influenced UN reliability and the willingness of MS to continue their contributions. That, in turn, undermined the UNPK activity, which caused it to fluctuate. In October 1995, SG Boutros-Ghali commented on the UN role and the intent of MS to rely on an underfunded organization. He described the situation as “responsibility without resources” (UNA-UK, The Financial Costs of Peacekeeping). However, it is clear that MS improved their payment discipline in the hard time periods of 1991-1992 (e.g., missions in Cambodia, Somalia, etc.) and 1994-1997 (e.g., missions in Rwanda, Balkans, etc.).

On the other hand, according to the Stockholm International and Peace Research Institute all sub-regional totals of military expenditures are greater than the entire UNPK budget for 1998 (about $908 billion). Hence, regional and sub-regional organizations could raise much more resources for PK than the UN. Moreover, it is helpful to know that the PE is much more expensive than the traditional PKO. It requires a standby, heavily equipped military force from one or more states (e.g., COW).[12]

 

5.         Basic United Nations Peacekeeping Procedures (UN, Special Topics: Peacekeeping)

General Peacekeeping Issues

The SC issues resolutions to the SG, which require reports on PK issues. The reports provide the SC with information on a mission’s activities within a specific timeframe, as well as the SG’s implications and recommendations underlying the SC decisions. It sends an annual report to the GA on its entire activity related to UNPK. The President of the SC and SG exchange letters on such issues as: appointments of SRSGs, FCs, CMOs and compositions of PKMs.

The GA approves annual budgets for PK. The Fourth Committee of the GA completely reviews the PKOs in all their aspects on the basis of the SC PKO report.

Individual Operations

The procedure for establishing an operation and its financing, planning and preparation is described in GGFPKO (1995, pp. 37-39). The SG sends a report for individual missions with information about: the political mandate, the operational plan, the staff and its composition, cost estimates for a given time period, and recommendations for actions to be taken by the GA. The ACABQ reviews all reports of the SG on financial questions related to the PK and submits its conclusions to the GA and the Fifth Committee where they are considered.

The Fifth Committee examines issues and submits a report to the GA with its consideration on those issues. It does the same with the final version of draft resolutions/decisions and provides a recommendation for adoption.

The decision for sending a UNPKM is made by the SC through resolutions when an invitation is received from the countries (parties) affected by a conflict. The SC is responsible of determining the mission’s mandate and its force level. Then the Fifth Committee allocates the mission budget. The DPKO develops and implements a deployment plan. (For more information see UN Special Topics: Peacekeeping.)

PKOs are the main means by which the UN presents to the world its ability to maintain global security. MS are “shareholders” of UNPK and they execute its policy by providing political support and resources: personnel, equipment, money, etc. for PKOs. The UN is a non-profit public organization that acquires assets to perform activities that are dependent on the amount and timing of MS payments. Less cash means less capability for UNPK. In a situation of under-funding, the expected results are outputs that do not match with standards and the defined mission.

 

B.        EVALUATION OF CURRENT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

 

1.         Advantages

Political

The UN has a parliamentary structure and represents most of the states and main economic, ethnic and religious groups in the world. The organization protects fundamental human rights, the rights of individual and national self-determination, and promotes principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence (Chapter I of the UN Charter). Its values focus on the beliefs and will of humanity (Preamble and Chapter I of the UN Charter). The UN is seen as an unbiased arbiter of conflicts and a reliable partner toward peace recovery and development. The UN is congruent with most of the cultures and religions over the world.

The GA is a ready for use open forum of international cooperation and dialogue and a political center with clear rules (see articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter). The SC makes decisions in a highly centralized fashion and the GA exercises an enhanced control on overall PK activity under common standards.

UNPK is based on international law and is a part of a consistent peaceshaping process supported by UNMS, NGOs and individuals providing funds and development assistance. UNPK can maintain unity of purpose and cohesive efforts, even though, there are members unwilling to cooperate for specific operations or when a dominating regional power is in opposition.

Military

The UN provides PKF with broad and sustainable political support, and legitimacy to intervene decisively in every corner of the world. The hierarchy of the command chain, along with centralization, has a potential for improved performance. Information intervention in a conflict is based on international community support and plays a critical role in a military resolution of disputes. For example, there are many occasions when parties to a dispute prefer UN troops to facilitate their peace efforts instead of forces from Regional Organizations and Arrangements (ROA) or Coalitions of the Willing (COW).

The UNPK doctrine is based on an accumulated knowledge of PK and an environment of recurring confrontations in different geographical areas (e.g., organs of UN DPKO such as the Situation Center and the Best Practices Unit). DPKO provides ready for use expertise.

Common standards of training and rules of engagement (ROE) assure greater coordination of units from different countries and effectiveness.

Relatively regular external funding and contributions of troops, equipment and services, combined with the SAS maintain military capabilities and resources for rapid deployment.

The UNPK information system and technology are more advanced than those of countries in many regions of the world.

Financial

UNPK has multiple independent sources of funding that are not tied to the economic and fiscal cycles of individual states or that of a particular region. MS, NGOs and individuals voluntarily bear and share portions of PK expenses.

The centralized decision-making on typical PK issues avoids duplicated structures and promotes economies of scale due to cost decreases for certain types decisions made at one point. (Nadler and Tushman, 1988, p. 112)

The budgets for operations reflect the missions’ objectives, maintain a reasonable balance of required resources and facilitate overall efficiency of operations. The subsidiaries of the PK enterprise are under common financial regulations, management and audit, which lead to increased accountability and transparency.

Actually, through UNPK the developed countries transfer money to third world countries, which are the main contributors of troops. Thus, UNPK gets PK resources at a lower cost and feeds respective national economies of donors at the same time.

 

2.         Disadvantages

Political

The procedures and composition (GIISA, 2001, p. 93) of the UN and the SC can extend the decision-making process beyond the time limits imposed by real needs. (GIISA, 2001, pp. 165 and 167) Crucial moments for conflict and even genocide prevention might be missed. According to the Brahimi report (p. 1) one of the three key conditions for the success of future multi-faceted operations is rapid deployment.

Members of the SC define the UN’s PK competence and thus eliminate state sovereignty (University of Maryland). Most of the conflicts have been internal or intra-state. Recent civil wars require political settlements contradicting the principle of state sovereignty and the traditional norms of behavior of countries represented in UN.

The SC does not adequately represent regions with conflicts and that undermines the SC’s legitimacy and effectiveness. However, the Brahimi report (p. 1) outlined political support as a key condition for the success of future complex operations. It recognizes the failure of PK to respond adequately to the challenges. Recent conflicts have “cross-border” or “transnational” effects and engage neighboring countries (refugees, engagement of regional military forces, trade issues, conflict-supporting activities, etc.).

UNPKF can only carry out PE in narrow boundaries in order to not threaten its political unity. The Brahimi report (pp. viii, 4) discusses the hardships experienced by the missions deployed at an early stage before the conflict end - parties involved have not been convinced to negotiate, possess heavy weapons and do not hesitate to use them. Missions under traditional PK cannot fit such situations with highly dangerous environments because of the complexity, the lack of capacity and increased costs. Often some of the local parties appear to be “spoilers” – they are not willing to achieve constant peace. Sometimes, they sign peace accords just to gain time and take temporal advantages. The third key condition for the success of future complex operations is a peace-building strategy that could overcome such intents. On the other hand, COW is an extension beyond the above boundaries.

The UN utilizes a highly centralized top-down decision-making approach for political settlements in a field characterized by vulnerability and diversity of people’s attitudes and support. A challenge to this approach is the need for regular flow of information and utilization of modern information systems. The lack of the last element was one of the findings of the Brahimi report.

Military

The UN Secretariat has to wait for SC authorization. It then raises and deploys troops after the beginning of a conflict. UN involvement at a later stage implies greater resources for a timely resolution. Moreover, it contradicts UN policy for conflict prevention and early engagement and the key conditions for the success of PKO outlined by the Brahimi report. Moreover, the report calls for improved mission guidance and leadership participation in mission establishment at its very beginning (shaping mission’s concept, plans and other documents), and a global logistics support strategy as well.

The lack of clear mandates (GIISA, 2001, pp. 79 and 83) and chain of command between missions and New York Headquarters, and the slow and inadequate decision-making on PKOs have lowered PKOs effectiveness and created unwillingness in military personnel to take orders from UN commanders instead of their own commanders. (GIISA, 2001, p. 84) The main points of the Brahimi report are establishing clear, credible and achievable mandates by the SC and the problems caused by a lack of a comprehensive staffing strategy.

There is no UNPK standby army. It is almost impossible for PE to be undertaken by a UN contingent. UNPK can easily reach limited force levels (ceiling) for troops, equipment, funding and other resources. The Brahimi report (p. 15) emphasizes the need for well equipped and trained UNPK troops possessing the capability for self-defense. For instance, the stockpile of the most important equipment in UNLB, Italy, has been depleted by the surge of operations over the 1990’s and current funding cannot replenish it soon.

PKOs are carried out in a decentralized manner because of their nature. An occurrence of many conflicts simultaneously would stretch the UNPKS and result in decreased effectiveness (e.g. Rwanda and Balkans). With regard to this the Brahimi report (pp. 12-13) pointed out the importance of improved information gathering, analysis, and strategic planning capacities. There are constraints for the analysis and centralized planning of PKOs such as: diversity of military terminology, technology, and personnel technical and English language skills.

Multinational Forces (MNF) have different approaches to information networks and to decision-making for operations taken far from the frontline and reality in the NY Headquarters. Sometimes, the UN systems do not fit the specificity of local infrastructure and natural conditions.

The UN information-processing capacity cannot capture the symptoms of potential conflicts and information does not reach central organs, which make decisions on operations. The UN cannot use intelligence under international agreement and it only gathers information. (CPT Huggins)

Deployment of UN troops is not standardized under specific models. (CPT Huggins) Rapid deployment standards are defined by the Brahimi report (2000, paragraphs 86-91, pp. 15-16). On the other hand, centralization and the lack of mission autonomy often remove achieved temporal advantages and diminish peacekeepers’ motivation.

Financial

The UNPK Support Account depends on MS assessed contributions and collection of arrears. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, the only available punishment for late payments is the state losing the right to vote in the GA. Moreover, funding for newly established missions is ad hoc.

Many MS are reluctant to increasing assessed contributions because of their budget constraints. Others argue that additional money for PK means undermining development assistance. In other words, there is an internal competition among MS.

The UNPK budget provides money for the operations of a medium size corporation, but its subsidiaries are deployed all over the world. The limited funding is a barrier to further UNPKS development and achieving the desired effectiveness. In turn, insufficient PKOs effectiveness leads to MS’s disappointment, demands for changing scale of assessments and nonpayment of dues.

Financial control of PK is not exercised by the DPKO and that decreases the flexibility of the Command chain. Inadequate feedback between UNPK field units and the New York Headquarters increases PK expenditures because of missing the right momentum for intervention at an earlier phase before conflict eruption.

The lack of money available for UNPK on several continents is an obstacle to initiation new missions by UN.

The irregular payments of dues to the UN Support Account and the respective reimbursements of contributing nations undermine the credibility of the UN.

 

C.        GREATER MOVEMENT TOWARD CENTRALIZATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

 

The Brahimi Report (UN. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 2000), in response to UN critics, includes 57 recommendations for change and transformation of UN peace operations and activities. Some focus on direction setting and others concentrate on developing capacity and achieving outputs and outcomes. In brief, the basic recommendations that support centralization are as follows:

-           Clear, Credible and Achievable Mandates - the SC should reconcile ceasefire and peace agreements with “threshold conditions” (international human rights standards, practicability, timelines) and create clear chain of command and unity of effort

-           Establishing Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat under Executive Committee on Peace and Security through consolidation of the existing departmental units dealing with policy and information analysis related to peace and security

-           Establishing Integrated Mission Task Forces within UN Headquarters for supporting each PKM from its Inception very Beginning (responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and personnel recruitment)

-           Formation of Joint Trained Multinational Brigades for deployment within 30 days in cases of traditional PK and within 90 days in cases of PKO with great complexity (intra-state conflicts)

-           Establishment of a National Pool of Civilian Police Officers by each MS as a part of civilian intervention capabilities and readiness for deployment of 1000 officers within 30 days (SG Presents Annual Report on Work of Organization, at the Fifty-fifth General Assembly, 12 September 2000)

-           Creating "On-call" Lists of Military and Police Officers and Experts (both about 100) by the SC for establishing new missions headquarters

-           Preparing a Global Logistics Support Strategy and Mission Start-up Kits in Brindisi to facilitate rapid responsiveness

-           Strengthening DPKO by restructuring and stuffing and assigning responsibility for PK budgets

-           Systematic utilization of information technology

All of the above recommendations are directed to improving coordination and control over multi-faceted activities, and increasing information flow for better decision-making (feedback), resource availability and logistics. The Brahimi report also emphasizes the need for a new effective system for conflict prevention using political and financial support of other UN organs, governments and NGOs.

 

III.    REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

 

Think Globally, Act Locally

 

Rene Dubos, Advisor to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972

 

A.        DESCRIPTION OF REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

                                      

1.                  Definition of Regional Peacekeeping

The international foundations of regional PK and its relationship with the UN are formulated in article 52, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Moreover, the SC has an obligation to encourage pacific settlements through regional arrangements or regional agencies before the UN. Member states also can refer local disputes to the SC and the SC may give recommendations at any stage to the parties of dispute, even take into consideration their common decisions. At any time, parties can use the options provided by articles 34 and 35 of the UN Charter. Any member of the UN or a non-member may bring its case to the SC or General Assembly for consideration. The only preliminary condition is an acceptance of pacific settlements under the UN Charter.

 

2.         Types of Regional Organizations

The type of regional organization (RO) has a great impact on security cooperation between members. Toivio (1997) provides a helpful grouping of ROs. They are comprised of three broad categories: classical ROs, collective self-defense organizations and organizations primarily created for more general purposes.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization of American States are examples of classical ROs. Main features of this type are: they fall under chapter VIII of the UN Charter; they cover a well-defined geographic region and parallel the structures of the UN; and they do not have the power of the SC regarding peace and security in their region.

An example of collective self-defense organizations is NATO. It is designed for mutual self-defense and is bound by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that considers an attack against any one of the member states as an attack against all. Activities beyond the scope of Article 5 are considered "Non-Article 5 Operations" or other than a collective self-defense. In these cases, actions against states or parties that are not pure aggression may refer to maintenance of international peace and security by ROs under Article 52 of the UN Charter. For example, the North Atlantic Council declared its support and resources to regional PK under the authority of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN.[13]

Examples of general purpose ROs are the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). They primarily deal with issues that are more general than security policy problems. Relationships among the member states are based on long-term interests such as economic concerns and cultural affairs. They serve as a foundation for consistent regional development, enhanced security and political coordination among the member states.

There are many ROs over the world but most of them neither have the security functions nor the operational capacity to initiate PKOs. Some regional bodies have developed and utilize mechanisms for conflict prevention including a deployment of Peacekeeping missions.[14].

 

3.         Examples of Regional Peacekeeping

UNPK principles are reflected in the charters of many ROs. Regional Organizations and Arrangements from all continents have embedded UNPK principles in their guiding documents and have built PK capabilities in identical ways.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The largest regional security organization in the world is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (formerly CSCE). It has 55 member states (MS) from Europe, Central Asia and North America.

CSCE Peacekeeping will be undertaken with due regard to the responsibilities of the United Nations in this field and will at all times be carried out in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. CSCE PK will take place in particular within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. The CSCE, in planning and carrying out PK operations, may draw upon the experience and expertise of the United Nations.

CSCE, Helsinki Document, Article 19.

Most countries of the Euro-Atlantic region are active members of the OSCE, and members of NATO or NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. OSCE PK deals with conflicts between its MS. Its PKOs may employ military and civilian personnel for missions such as: cease-fire observation, monitoring troop withdrawals, humanitarian and medical assistance, and deployment of forces for large-scale operations. It complies with the UN principles of nonuse of coercion, consent and impartiality. Moreover, OSCE maintains transparency through informing the UN SC of its PKOs and imposes time limits on the activities. One or more of the MS may request OSCE for a PKO.

A Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) carries out political control and guidance. The Council of OSCE is its organ for day-to-day decision-making. Both bodies may initiate and deploy PKOs. Their decisions should be taken by consensus and define clear and exact mandates. The CSO is distinguished from the SC by its structure and procedures. It represents all of its members and does not employ the right of veto.

The MS provide personnel upon invitation of the Chairman-in-Office (CIO). The Chain of Command is similar to that of UNPK. An ad hoc group assists the CIO and the Head of Mission through monitoring of and operational support for the mission. Its members are representatives of the MS contributing personnel or providing important support.

For its financial arrangements, the OSCE insists on attaining maximum efficiency and cost-effectiveness, clear budgets, predetermined scale of assessments agreed to at the beginning of each calendar year, voluntary contributions of and financial accountability to the MS. An essential collaboration through resources, experience and expertise could be requested from EU, NATO and other international organizations concerned. The Total OSCE 2003 Unified Budget is 185.7 Million Euro, including 20.1 Million Euro for Missions and Field Operations. (OSCE, The OSCE 2003 Unified Budget by Fund) Currently, the OSCE maintains missions, centers, offices and representatives in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Still on the table are two mutual concurrent ideas - the US has proposed a NATO Response Force of 20,000 troops while the EU insists on creation of a EU Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) of 60,000 troops by the end of 2003. Both will impact NATO funding. As Wilkinson (2001) points out, “Without the combat power, strategic lift and intelligence that only the US can currently offer, neither NATO nor the EURRF is likely to deter a hostile and combat capable aggressor, without a very considerable increase in European defense spending”

In March 2003 EU first PKM was established in Skopje, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where a European Force replaced NATO troops.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Since the middle 1990’s NATO[15] has deployed PK troops in the Balkans - Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Operation Amber Fox (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The UN SC gave a one-year mandate (December 1995-1996) to the NATO multinational IFOR to secure the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its successor SFOR continues to operate according to a UN mandate for peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Both missions have applied robust rules of engagement (ROE) to achieve their objectives and for self-defense. Operation Amber Fox was requested by the president of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in order to protect international monitoring missions of the EU and the OSCE. The purpose of all NATO missions in the Balkans is to support stabilization, build foundations of peace-building and contribute to the efforts of the UN and other organizations in the field.

In Kosovo, cooperation between the UN, the EU and NATO was planned from the beginning. NATO is responsible for security, the UN runs police and civil services (administration, humanitarian assistance, etc.), and the EU is responsible for reconstruction of the economy and its further development. The division of labor reflects the interests, capabilities and resources of the participating organizations. The strategic alliance has a potential to optimize overall efforts and achieve synergy.

The number of the UN MS contributors to PKOs in the Balkans has increased gradually to 37, including countries from NATO, Partnership for Peace initiative, Asia, Africa, South America, Australia and New Zealand. The Secretaries General of UN and NATO have maintained constructive contacts. Cooperation in PK has led to institutional development of and greater cohesion among the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and organizations and agencies involved in the complex PKOs. They have shared the burden of PK and costs over the last decade - billions of US Dollars. For example, NATO approved a Y2001 total military budget of 746 Million Euro and seven percent of that total was for PSO (NATO handbook). Recently, the EU has initiated deeper engagement in European PK and pursues a dominant role.

The African Union

The former Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the current African Union (AU) is comprised of all 53 nations on the African continent except Morocco. Since the middle of the 90’s, African sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, Republic of South Africa website)[16], the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD, Horn of Africa), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have played an active role in conflict prevention in their sub-regions.

Regional PK in Africa has long traditions and rich experience. Ameen Jan[17] describes in detail the involvement of African society and ROs in conflict management. Fresh examples of regional PKOs are the deployment of international troops to the Ivory Coast (five participating nations from the ECOWAS) and the African Mission in Burundi (three participating nations from the AU, Agency France-Press). Several developed countries provide funding to the ECOWAS’ operation.

Some of the important PK initiatives were the US-led African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the French Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities (RECAMP) for the development of African PK capabilities. They have provided many African nations with training and equipment for their PK forces. The initiatives are open to NGO’s and private organizations. Achievement of self-sustaining capability for complex PKO is a joint effort of the developed countries, the UN, the OAU and the sub-regional organizations in Africa.

The following ACRI’s principles (US Department of State, Principles of Peacekeeping in Africa) are RECAMP’s principles as well and underlay the regional PK:

Long-term capacity enhancement – self-sustained capacity of a group of countries for rapid and effective international PKO;

Openness – open to all states and international contributors and donors (funding, equipment, training, expertise, etc.) unless the UN SC has imposed sanctions on them;

Legitimacy - calls for regular consultations and coordination with the OAU and the UN and their close supervision;

Transparency - full transparency to all stakeholders of the regional PK as a prerequisite for increased support from the international community.

The Organization of American States (OAS)

The OAS represents 34 MS. Its purposes (Article 2, OAS Charter) are settlement of the peace and security, conflict prevention, pacific settlement of disputes and common actions in case of aggression on the continent.

The Association of South-East Asian Nations

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 10 MS. The aim of its Bangkok Declaration (Asian Declaration) is: “To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

Initially, Asian countries were firmly opposed to interference in their regional and internal affairs. There was a general lack of interest in forming and maintaining regional peace associations (McNair, 1998) In addition, some conflicts were too big or explosive (e.g. Korea and Taiwan). Thus, the ASEAN members tended to rely on the UN for initiating PKO in the region.

However, the Papua New-Guinea PK mission led by Australia was the first regional cooperative PK effort. It launched greater cooperation between neighbor states for peaceshaping and building mutual trust through regional PK.

The Arab League

The league is comprised by 22 Arab states from Africa and Asia. Most of them are members of the AU and/or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). One of its objectives is “maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter” (The Arab League, Joint Defense And Economic Cooperation Treaty Between The States Of The Arab League).[18]

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) consists of 12 MS that are former Soviet republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and republics from Central Asia. One of its goals is peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts among MS (Article 2, Charter of CIS). The MS have declared their adherence to the Charter of the UN, the Helsinki Document and other documents of the OSCE. The CIS intend is to play a role of a regional PK organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter [19].

 

4.         Regional Conflicts

Table 2 depicts a significant increase in the number of conflicts in Africa (on average more than six conflicts per year), Asia (fell to about three per year) and Europe after the end of the Cold War. A number of civil wars and low level disputes occurred in East Europe, Africa, and Central and South-East Asia. They threatened the lives and development of millions of people. Genocides occurred in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia (Stanton, 2002). Confronting parties employed political, ethnic, national, religious, racial and clan differentiation to kill thousands of their opponents including children and women (e.g., Rwanda and Bosnia).

 

 

Table 2. Total number of deployed PKO and the total number of world conflicts in the period 1989-2001 (After: The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the World Bank)

 

In the period 1996-2001 the average numbers of new conflicts per year erupted in all regions, but in Africa (Table 2), the numbers are close to those during the Cold War. The PKOs (UNTSO, Palestine, 1948) and the newly established one (UNAMA, Afghanistan, 2002) are in regions with the longest conflicts. Recent trends of world armed conflicts (Figure 6) show increased conflicts in Africa and Asia, from 61% to 85%, due to the rise in Africa. Moreover, these regional conflicts represent a new type of conflict - intra-state and complex, civil wars with hidden periods and sudden breakouts. Many also have become interrelated with anti-terrorism activities (e.g., Afghanistan).

 

 

Figure 6. The shares of conflicts in all regions over the periods: 1946-1988, 1989-1995 and 1996-2001 (After: The World Bank)

 

B.        UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

                     

1.         Forms of Cooperation Between United Nations and Regional Organizations

The SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter. When it comes to enforcement actions done by regional arrangements, the SC is the only organ that authorizes and gives them legitimacy (Article 53). The UN sets the general benchmarks for regional PK and monitors their compliance with existing UN guidance. It has a responsibility to assist MS and regional associations in developing common PK doctrine and concepts (The Challenges Project, 2002, pp. 89-108).

The information flow to the SC and the monitoring function are guaranteed through timely and complete reporting obligations of the ROs and their agencies (Article 53). Liaison officers and other personnel authorized by the SC communicate with the UN and monitor regional activities.

Although the UN is highly centralized, as indicated in Chapter II, the SC has delegated many of its functions to regional bodies (UN, An Agenda for Peace, paragraphs 64 and 65).[20].

According to the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (paragraph 86) the forms of peace support cooperation between the UN and ROs can take the following forms:

-                     Consultations (reports, meetings, open or close consultations)

-                     Diplomatic support (initiatives of ROs)

-                     Operational support (military force, logistic, etc)

-                     Co-deployment or agreed upon partnering between missions with distinct mandates deployed from the UN and the ROA (ECOWAS - Liberia, CIS-Georgia). They can perform similar or interdependent specialized functions to resolve complex problems

-                     Joint Operations are jointly formed and funded (e.g., UN and OAS in Haiti).

 

2.         Principles of Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations

The Principles for Enhancing Cooperation are the following (An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 88):

-                     Establishment of mechanisms for consultations (formal and informal);

-                     Respect for the primacy of the UN (ROs should not enter into arrangements that assume a level of UN support not yet submitted to or approved by its MS);

-                     Clear preliminary definition and agreement on division of labor in order to avoid overlapping and institutional rivalry between the UN and the regional bodies when they work jointly with a number of mediators on a conflict;

-                     Common UN standards to deal with PK when ROs are also MS of the UN.

 

C.        ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

                   

1.                  Advantages

ROA have certain advantages: interrelated and higher stakes in regional security; historical political, ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic relationships; specific levels of mutual interdependence; better knowledge of their regions; less expensive resources (human, training, equipment, information, etc.); existing channels for early warning systems; a potential for rapid and timely response to conflicts in neighbor countries; convenient and cheaper rotation of PK contingents and their personnel; common or similar doctrines, terminology and languages; and so on. Such advantages increase cohesiveness of regional communities, especially in hard times when the UN cannot cover successfully most of the world conflicts itself.

Political

The ROs have a parliamentary structure that is likely to represent the states involved in or neighbor countries of a conflict. Common interests uphold the organizations’ unity of purpose and cohesion. The MS ROs have interrelated and higher stakes in regional security and close political, ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic relationships.

ROs are ready to use as open forums for local communities. They are convenient tools for permanent cooperation and dialogue, and political centers with predetermined rules. The MS make important decisions, especially those for PKOs, by consensus. By contrast, decision making within the UN is more labored. Although the SC is comprised of only 15 MS, the total number of the UN MS is 191 and any of the permanent members of the SC (P5) can preclude decision-making by using the right of veto.

The UN Charter also recognizes regional security mechanisms as the first line barrier against conflict. Their existence increases legitimacy in the eyes of the SC.

The regional and sub-regional organizations are the middlemen of the UN. Most of them are registered under the UN Charter. They are regional players with a lead role in particular spheres of PK (political, military, economic, etc.). They have a potential to be the most effective mediators because of their knowledge of the region’s political environment, culture, economic and other conditions.

The ROA and the UN share responsibilities on the basis of their comparative advantages in order to avoid competition and duplication of structures. Engagement of ROA gives opportunities for more flexible decision-making, negotiations and compromises, and faster mounting of PKO and achieving the end of the conflict. A broader application of UN common doctrine, concepts and standards will promote

increasing the level of the GA control over overall PK activity. The UN can drop some of its functions and delegate them to ROA. It can focus on the most important indicators of crisis.

Most of the MS of the ROA have direct interests in resolving conflicts as soon as possible and they are much more sensitive (existing channels for early warning systems) than other states in the world (regional cross border flow of refugees, potential immigration, political and economic instability, etc.).

Dominant regional powers are deeply involved in regional security systems and may be able to influence conflicting parties at a higher degree through direct contacts. They have much more freedom and can exploit innovative methods to leverage regional interdependence.

The ROA are one more cell in the PK system. They provide an opportunity to eliminate the isolation of individual states and organizations, achieve closer cooperation and synergy on the basis of comparative advantages, and increase political support and direct contributions to PKOs. ROA engagement in regional PK is a necessary step toward strengthening the unity of purpose of the entire world community.

Military

The ROA with military components, especially those for self-defense (e.g., NATO), provide a more suitable political frame for initiating PKOs and sustainable support. They have a clearly defined command chain. Long cooperation among MS and their military units over years builds knowledge, expertise, mutual reliance and improved coordination for rapid response through all military services - air, ground, navy, intelligence, etc.

It is likely that the ROA will have common doctrine, language and procedures and be aware of environmental conditions in their geographical areas. They can easily establish international schools and courses under common standards of training and ROE. Short distances provide an opportunity for joint exercises.

The ROA are more flexible than the UN in several important dimensions: diversity of resources, deployment of troops, logistics support, and available infrastructure close to the frontline. Some ROs may have high tech equipment (e.g., NATO). The ROA are near to the field of conflict and can gather and process useful information faster. Thus, they can make timely important decisions, and control, coordinate and correct their activities in the field. The MS can determine their zones of responsibilities and division of labor faster in order to increase overall efficiency.

The PKOs require frequent rotation of units (every six months) and that gives an important advantage to neighbor countries. They can use different armed units according to immediate tasks.

Financial

The ROA can provide independent sources for funding that will reduce uncertainty before particular PKM, especially when a MS does not want to participate.

Local resources are less expensive than those used by the UN. Expenditures for their loading and shipping are many times lower because of short distances and local labor rates. In turn, local companies benefit from PK. PK boosts the regional economies. Additionally, the developed countries transfer money to the third world countries through delegated PK.

The decentralized decision-making is more focused and employs greater expertise. It decreases the costs of PKM. At the regional level it promotes economies of scale due to cost decreases at every stage of operations.

The budgets for operations are related to the ROs long-term goals in their respective regions and depend on the level of commitment to regional security. The MS can bring additional resources to sustain their involvement and facilitate UNPK. Some wealthy countries are committed to providing required resources for their own operations. Every state utilizes its existing financial regulations, and its own management and audit procedures. This leads to decreased costs for financial control and enhanced accountability and transparency.

 

2.         Disadvantages

Regional PK has limitations including: some major regional powers have greater power and often a lack of neutrality; low levels of PK capabilities (troops, civilian police, headquarters, equipment, etc.); and insufficient training, expertise, management skills, and funding.

Political

The legitimacy of the international security system still calls for authorization of PKOs by the SC and the broad political base provided by the UN. A natural disadvantage of ROs is the lack of multinationality, multidimensional response and incompetence in some spheres of complex PKOs.

There is a trend towards increasing reliance on regional and sub-regional organizations for conflict resolution. This leads to imbalance and leaving regional bodies alone in their efforts. (Speech of the Secretary-General on the future of Peacekeeping Operations Georgetown University, February 1999)

Some ROA do not have specific mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Sometimes ROs cannot get a consensus, which is an obstacle to initiation of PKO in a timely manner.

Regional powers may dominate institutions in a way that benefits only them.[21] Moreover, MS unintentionally are parties to most of the local conflicts and they experience difficulties in maintaining impartiality. Their participation may put at risk their own internal stability.

Many ROA do not have PK capacities and expertise, especially for complex PKOs. That requires cooperation between the ROA and the UN under the aforementioned principles and mechanisms.

Decentralization of PK through ROA increases demand on the UN to improve information processing and funding, set adequate goals and standards, monitor ROA’s activities and increase its ability to implement corrective actions on time. Diminished limitations to low-level decision makers increase the risk of loss of control and worsening overall coordination. (Nadler and Tushman, 1988, page 111)

Military

A lack of impartiality of the governments could result in different directions and goals for their forces, which would decrease the effectiveness of PKM.

Most of the ROs do not have military forces, resources and experience to carry out PKOs (The Brahimi Report, p. 10), so, they need externally provided training, equipment and logistical support. There are no regional PK standby armies.

The ROA have not developed the capabilities to analyze and plan PKOs because of constraints such as: diversity of military terminology, technology, technical skills, and short and occasional training. Language barriers cause problems in some regions.

The constant shortage of funding leads to insufficient numbers of joint exercises and levels of preparedness for PK contingents, slow deployments, ineffective command and control, and poor intelligence and logistics support. Additionally, the number and quality of peacekeepers’ equipment do not meet requirements for contemporary PKOs.

Financial

Few ROA have money for complex PK, which calls for external funding. PKOs are funded ad hoc. Budgets of ROs are substantially below the UNPK budget. Organizations and arrangements must count on multiple external sources, which causes great uncertainty. There are controversial views that funding should be provided by voluntary trust funds[22] or directly by the UNPK budget.

The ROA have sources of funding that are tied with the economic and fiscal cycles of individual states or those of a particular region. Very often a conflict can affect all countries in the respective region.

Decentralization of PK brings costs for new local structures and the management controlling their activities and duplicated organs as well.

 

IV.     CONCLUSIONS

 

Chapters II and III summarize the advantages and disadvantages of centralizing and regionalizing peace operations. From this overview, we find that neither approach is satisfactory on its own. Neither one provides the necessary knowledge and resources (military, financial, material, information, etc.) to satisfactorily deal with all types of conflicts. Thus, this report takes the position that there are aspects of each structural feature that need to be incorporated into an overall approach to peace operations. Some decisions about PK should be made in a centralized manner, while others should be decentralized to the ROAs and the individual states, possibly to NGOs and businesses. The following list of measures would enable the UN to take into account the positive aspects of both centralization and regionalization and also create a more cohesive and integrated peace operation system that would provide overall legitimacy, political will and management of the PK enterprise:

Political

-           The UN SC should retain authorization of PKO, especially PE, and approval of achieved accords;

-           Regional bodies, however, should have the right to set up PKOs without SC resolutions in order to immediately respond to conflicts and prevent conflicts from becoming large-scale crises (Articles 33 and 52 of the UN Charter);

-           While the UN is developing its centralized procedures and organs (e.g. SC, Executive Committee on Peace and Security, Integrated Mission Task Forces), the ROA should create and apply mechanisms and procedures for conflict prevention on the basis of the UN principles and standards that have already been recognized (Chapter VIII of the UN Charter). The UN should stimulate and support such regional initiatives;

-           The UN should develop a central Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat to support ROA and facilitate the responses to complex challenges;

-           ROA and governments also should build early-warning systems and information capabilities compatible with UN systems to insure timely and regular information flow among all players;

-           A clear procedure with a mandatory schedule for resolving disputes at every consecutive level (parties to the conflict, state, ROA and SC) should be established under Articles 33, 34, 3 and, 37 of the UN Charter. Such a procedure requires explicit definitions and agreements on the rights and responsibilities of states, ROA and the UN;

-           The UN should introduce objective and broadly accepted criteria and measures for controlling disputes, especially threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Detailed criteria will speed up the decision-making process;

-           A comprehensive incentive scheme for engagement of neighboring and regional powerful states in PK should play an important role. An example of incentives would be a partial compensation or increased support provided by UN agencies, programs and funds. A system of sanctions already exists (economic, arms embargoes, travel bans, etc. under Chapter VII of the UN Charter);

-           Regions should introduce specific planning and programming of PK and supporting activities that would be compatible with UN PK planning and programming. This will give adequate estimates of necessary expenditures and help sustain regional PK capabilities. Additionally, it will facilitate integration between the UN and regional pools of resources. All participants in PK (at both the central and regional levels) will have short and long-term objectives and tasks aimed at realizing a common goal. It will remove duplication and promote synergy;

-           When a conflict occurs, responses could be assigned to the UN, a ROA or both, or to individual governments, NGOs and companies depending on the nature of the conflict. Decisions on who participates will be made according the agreements on rights and responsibilities of states, ROA and the UN discussed above.

Military:

-           Each region should form, equip, and train joint regional military contingents (brigades) under UN standards (e.g., SHRIBRIG and Multinational Military Peace Force of South-Eastern Europe - MPFSEE);

-           Each region should have clear priorities. A major objective would be to participate in regional-mandated operations and/or in UN initiated operations;

-           Since regional PK is not always applicable (many parties of conflicts refuse local mediators and negotiations and some regions lack the resources or the will to establish and develop PK capacities), the UN should continue to centralize its systems for establishing reliable PKO (UNSAS, funding, training and evaluation, information gathering, etc.);

-           The UN should integrate available centers, universities, governmental organs, etc., dedicated to peace operations in order to standardize PK activities and to provide ROA with training in conflict prevention, PK and peace-building;

-           ROA also should accommodate the training and embed UN standards in their regulations;

-           ROA, respective governments and the UN should share the costs and resources for PK and support forces such as transport and other services provided by companies, organizations, and governmental and intergovernmental bodies in the region. It should be written in the agreements and secured through consistent planning, programming and building PK capacities;

-           The joint training of multinational forces for brigades and regions should become standard;

-           Common language for communication and terminology should be mandatory among all regions and should be consistent with UN language and concepts.

Financial:

-           The UN should maintain overall financial management of complex PKO;

-           The UN, in collaboration with ROA, governments and NGOs, should create a methodology for gathering information and estimating expenditures for all participants in UN-mandated or regionally-mandated operations (PK, PE, PSO, etc.). This would enable all participants to have an accurate set of measures of contributions to peace operations and a basis for adequate decisions at the UN and regional levels. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security, as a coordinating body of the UN components, would then have the opportunity to use these measures and information to direct the entire system in the optimal way;

-           ROA should contribute money for local PK and joint training. If a global tax for PK is not acceptable, then the UN should promote the idea that part of every state or military budget should be redirected for regional PK. The contributions could be a certain percentage of the military budgets or specific assessments (e.g., the UNPK assessments);

-           The UN should use its central funds to focus on those regions with the greatest current needs and meet emerging confrontations;

-           ROA could contribute money for specific activities that reflect their interests or are executed by their forces or companies;

-           Different sources of funding (UN, ROA, etc.) should be exploited on the basis of temporal borrowing (lending) and repayment (The World Bank could be a middleman) or an insurance approach. Diversity of resources (UN, trust funds, ROA funds and other) should be used interchangeably to reduce uncertainty of funding PKO due to local or UN difficulties.

In conclusion, this report contends that we need to move beyond the debate on whether to centralize or regionalize peace operations. The fundamental solution to global security and PK is a combination of UNPK and regional PK incorporating the advantages of each into an overall system. The strength of the UN is not in its day-to-day regional PK activities but in its potential to focus and optimize global efforts at the desired moment and place, to reinforce and build up regional PK capacity, and to maintain peace and security in the long run through its network system.

 

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INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

 

1.      Defense Technical Information Center

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2.      Dudley Knox Library

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3.      Abdia Mohamed

      Washington, D.C. USA

 

4.      Global Policy Forum

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5.      International Peace Academy

      New York, New York, USA

     

6.      Pearson Peacekeeping Centre

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7.      United Nations University

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8.      Institute for Security Studies, South Africa

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10.  German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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12.  Professor Nancy Roberts

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13.  Professor John Mutty

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